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CAN WE TALK? 

A Review of Jay Katz, The Silent World of 

Doctor and Patient 

ARTHUR CAPLAN* 
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient I is an eloquent plea for 
recasting the doctor-patient relationship. Professor Katz convincingly 
demonstrates that both the medical and legal professions have not 
done enough to insure that honest and open communication in doctor­
patient relationships will prevail in both therapeutic and experimental 
settings. Physicians, as Katz perceptively notes, are "well trained to 
attend caringly to patients' physical needs" (p. 130). But, as he ob­
serves, little in their training prepares them to attend with skill or zeal 
to patients' decisionmaking needs. 
Philosophers, theologians and legal scholars place much emphasis 
upon patient autonomy in their writings in analyzing the norms that 
ought to constitute the researcher-subject and physician-patient 
relationships. 2 
But the harsh reality is quite different from the idealized norm. 
As Professor Katz argues convincingly through his careful analysis of 
legal cases, clinical case studies, and the close examination of codes of 
professional conduct in medicine, physicians have been unwilling to 
actually share decisionmaking authority with their patients, and the 
legal system has been, at best, reluctant to attempt jurisprudential re­
forms that would challenge or disturb this reluctance. 
Professor Katz cites a number of factors relevant to our under­
standing of the gap between theory and practice, or perhaps more ac­
curately, ideology and practice. In part, he notes, medicine's 
professional dominance and social prestige in Western societies has 
been secured by cloaking the details of medical skill and knowledge in 
* Associate Director, Hastings Center; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1979. 
I. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
2. H. T. ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS (1986); R. VEATCH, 
A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1981); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF IN­
FORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982); Miller, Auton
omy & the Refusal ofLifesaving Treatment, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1981, at 22-28. 
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a thick fog composed of equal parts mystery and secrecy.3 
Esoteric knowledge is critically important if medicine is to retain 
its position of dominance both with respect to patients and with re­
spect to social institutions that might attempt to regulate or weaken 
professional control and discretion. For centuries, medicine has been 
able to keep those outside the profession at bay epistemologically by 
the use of technical jargon, strange rituals, and through the rigid con­
trol of education and licensure regarding health and medical practice.4 
The desire to keep laymen ignorant of medical beliefs and skills 
has been exacerbated by a number of social and economic forces in the 
post World War II era. The introduction of more technology-thera­
peutic, palliative, and diagnostic-has brought with it an increasing 
emphasis on specialization within the medical profession. Economic 
considerations have encouraged the institutionalization and centraliza­
tion of the delivery of medical services. Not only is professional sover­
eignty propped up by a cult of mystery within the profession, but 
health care is now delivered in settings that are themselves distant, 
mysterious, complex, imposing and awe inspiring both in size and in 
technological ritual. As medicine becomes, and is encouraged to be­
come, increasingly faceless and bureaucratic in the name of cost con­
tainment, efficacy, and competition, as fewer and fewer patients know 
or have any sort of personal, intimate relationship with a specific phy­
sician, the prospects for conversation and open communication be­
come increasingly dim. 
If nothing more than greed, power, and control were at fault for 
the failure of physicians to give greater weight to dialogue and com­
munication, it might be difficult as a practical matter to change the 
norms of the doctor-patient relationship, but it would not be difficult 
to articulate a moral basis for doing so. After all, liberal individualism 
is alive and well in Western societies, and few Americans feel tolerant 
of those who would rob them of their rights to control their own bod­
ies and lives. The prospects for effecting the kind of moral reform 
sought by Professor Katz are greatly complicated by the fact that good 
as well as evil underlies medicine's long-standing commitment to si­
lence rather than conversation in doctor-patient relationships. 
Professor Katz suggests it is professional greed mixed with a 
healthy dose of professional embarrassment that has hindered the 
evolution of conversation as the mainstay of interpersonal relation­
ships in therapy and experiment. But this analysis places the burden 
3. C. B. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAW AND ETHICS (1984). 
4. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
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of responsibility for the promulgation of secrecy and silence solely on 
the medical profession. If medicine has often reached back to its 
quasi-religious roots for its professional authority and autonomy, then 
it is equally true that its clientele has felt an equally powerful need to 
maintain and support these values as defining the kind of virtues it 
wants its healers to exemplify. 
Medical professionals are not alone in bearing responsibility for 
allowing silence to dominate doctor-patient and researcher-subject in­
teractions. Subjects and patients are at fault as well. 5 Patients have 
allowed silence to substitute for conversation as a result of a convic­
tion, shared and reinforced by their doctors, that healing can be 
brought about only when the patient exemplifies the virtues of trust, 
obedience, and compliance. Medical uncertainty and ignorance have 
long been seen as the primary threats to patient hope, and thus to the 
efficacy of medical interventions, not just by physicians but by their 
patients as well. 
While medicine has eagerly seized the role of priest or even deity 
in formulating the values that constitute the boundaries of healer-pa­
tient interrelationships, it is equally true that patients also have re­
ceived a great deal of satisfaction in having someone occupy this role. 
Physicians may have been quick to fill the void left by the decline of 
authority accorded organized religion in Western societies, but it must 
be recognized, as Professor Katz seems less willing to grant, that it is 
their clientele who have been equally eager to have someone occupy 
this social niche. 
Professor Katz suggests that Upatients rightfully have felt 
cheated" (p. 206) by the Uduplicities, evasions, and lies that have infil­
trated conversations with patients and made meaningful disclosure 
and consent a charade" (p. 206). I would agree that there is far more 
empty ritual and half-hearted compliance with the much ballyhooed 
norms of disclosure and consent on the part of the medical profession 
than the contemporary rhetoric of medical ethics would lead one to 
expect. My own observations of patients interacting with their doctors 
in a wide spectrum of clinical and experimental settings compel me to 
disagree that the failure to behave wholeheartedly and enthusiastically 
in accordance with the ethical strictures of disclosure and consent has 
been met with protest or resentment on the part of patients or those 
5. Siegler, The Doctor-Patient Encounter and Its Relationship to Theories ofHealth 
and Disease, in CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE 627-44 (A. Caplan, H. T. Engel­
hardt, Jr., & J. McCartney, eds. 1981). 
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who serve as the subjects of biomedical research (chs. one, two, and 
seven). 
The challenge faced by Professor Katz and others who desire a 
more open and honest exchange of information between doctors and 
their subjects or patients is that a commitment to the power of magical 
thinking is based upon benevolent, not malevolent motives on the part 
of health care providers and an equal commitment to the power of 
blind faith, miracles, and the healing power of hope on the part of 
patients. Obedience, compliance, and trust are, in the appropriate set­
tings, virtues not vices. This is what makes it so difficult to inject more 
conversation into physician-patient interactions. Both parties under­
stand that a commitment to the open and frank exchange of informa­
tion about what is and is not known concerning risks, benefits, 
prognosis, and efficacy will require the abandonment of other values 
believed, rightly or wrongly, to be instrumentally useful in their own 
right. 
There is little empirical evidence to show that blind faith in medi­
cal expertise hastens or aids the power of medical interventions in the 
struggle against disease. (I suspect a random clinical trial would show 
that those who are atheistic or agnostic about the divine status of their 
healers do as well as devoted believers in the powers of the medical 
priesthood in confronting serious disease and disability.) Indeed there 
is some evidence that demonstrates that compliance and obedience are 
facilitated not by blind trust and obedience to authority, but rather by 
informed human beings who recognize each other's fallibility and lim­
its.6 Nonetheless, the myth of the power of faith to heal when 
grounded in benevolent motives on the part of physicians and strongly 
felt needs on the part of patients and subjects will not die easily. 
There is a bit of a moralizing tone to some of Professor Katz's 
analysis which may tum off some of his physician colleagues from the 
important message he would like them to hear. Katz suggests that the 
burden physicians incur by remaining silent rather than talking openly 
with those in their charge is enormous (pp. 171-75, 198-99). It is the 
physician who must feel guilt when medical regimens do not produce 
the expected and hoped for result. It is the physician who is the object 
of disappointment, frustration, and scorn when death, as it always 
eventually does, terminates the doctor-patient relationship. 
I worry that physicians may not heed the words of support and 
sustenance Professor Katz offers if they are blinded by their anger at 
6. See generally C. W. LIDZ, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, L. SESTAK & 
L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984). 
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the suggestion that they have somehow consciously plotted against the 
public to maintain the norm of silence in an effort to secure wealth, 
prestige, and autonomy for themselves. There is a very real danger 
that those who need to attend most closely to the recommendations 
Professor Katz offers will not do so since he is not alone in diagnosing 
the source of silence in the desire for authority and prestige. A 
number of important studies of the history of medicine in the United 
States, such as those by Paul Starr,7 David Rosner, 8 Ruth and Victor 
Sidel,9 and others lO have also laid the charge of conspiracy at the door 
of the medical profession. 
Professor Katz and these other analysts define the cause of the 
problem of silence in a way that physicians know is simply not true. It 
is not just greed and a lust for power that has led medicine and the law 
to tolerate too much silence in physician-patient communication; pa­
tients and subjects have desired silence as well. 
Can any profession, class, or group, even one as mysterious and 
insular as medicine, retain sovereignty over those they serve and, in­
deed, over social institutions generally, without some willing compli­
ance on the part of those who are the recipients (beneficiaries? 
victims?) of their services? After all, physicians have no means of 
forcing people into their offices and hospitals. Whatever else may be 
wrong in doctor-patient relationships, those who are the victims of 
silence are still there voluntarily. 
The harsh reality is that it is not only physicians who believe in 
the need for secrecy, silence, and mystery where healing is concerned. 
Patients believe it, too. It is true that many patients and research sub­
jects are attempting to assert themselves, to be heard and to indicate 
their willingness to listen closely and carefully to what their physicians 
have to say. But the imposition of paternalism and the subjugation of 
autonomy are not, as many medical ethicists suggest,II the central sins 
of moral life in health care settings. The most common phrase heard 
in both experimental and therapeutic encounters is, "I don't know, 
doc-you decide. You're the doctor." 
Physicians are still as likely if not more likely to be confronted by 
patients and subjects who do not want to listen, who do not want to 
, 
7. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
8. D. ROSNER, A ONCE CHARITABLE ENTERPRISE (1982). 
9. V. SIDEL & R. SIDEL, A HEALTHY STATE (1982). 
10. See, e.g., E. R. BROWN, ROCKEFELLER MEDICINE MEN: MEDICINE AND CAPI­
TALISM IN AMERICA (1979). 
11. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); 
Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 370-90 (1978). 
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engage in a conversation, but rather who are more than willing to 
waive their autonomy in the hope that others who know better, who 
are more powerful, or who are more intimately connected with the 
mysterious forces of healing will make decisions for them rather than 
with them. The real moral challenge facing medicine and those such 
as Professor Katz who wish to create an environment in which open 
and honest communication can flourish is to decide what behaviors 
are legitimate in the face of patient indifference or even hostility to full 
participation in the conversations that guide medical encounters. 
Paternalism is an easy target for those outside the medical profes­
sion to attack. Far more discomfiting, but, I believe far more impor­
tant, is the issue of to what extent the medical profession ought to be 
held responsible for restoring or enhancing autonomy when it is de­
nied, given away, or repressed in the name of healing or out of lazi­
ness, fear, or indifference. 
Professor Katz suggests that educational reforms are in order 
within medicine if secrecy and silence are to give way to communica­
tion and open conversation in the doctor-patient relationship (pp. 150­
54). In this he is surely correct. Little emphasis is placed upon the 
skills of interviewing, listening and communicating in most medical 
school curricula. But is a greater emphasis on communication skills 
and even, as Professor Katz hints, critical self-examination of one's 
character and behavior, enough? 
Some medical educators12 have recognized that a selection pro­
cess which rewards expertise in the natural sciences and an aptitude 
for performing well on standardized examinations is not necessarily 
one which will produce physicians inclined to listen closely, talk 
openly and admit their limits and their ignorance when they exist. It 
may be necessary to change not only what is taught in medical school, 
as Katz suggests, but who is there to learn in order to assure more 
conversation on the part of medical professionals. 
The economics of medical practice also hinder conversation. Pa­
tients often complain that they spend far more time waiting to see 
doctors then they actually spend with them. At the same time, most 
methods of reimbursement in health care, both retrospective and pro­
spective, are much more closely attuned to paying the doctor on the 
basis of what is done than to paying the doctor for time spent in con­
versation. Conversation, as Professor Katz makes clear, is essential 
12. See, e.g., D. CALLAHAN, A. CAPLAN & B. JENNINGS, ApPLYING THE HUMANI­
TIES (1985); E. CASSELL, THE PLACE OF THE HUMANITIES IN MEDICINE (1984); Pelle­
grino, Educating the Humanistic Physician, 235 J. A.M.A., 1288-94 (1974). 
49 1987] CAN WE TALK? 
for both doctor and patient if both are to bear the costs, physical, emo­
tional, psychic and financial, imposed by disease and disability. In our 
present health care system, however, talk is cheap---too cheap to get 
many physicians to attend to it seriously. 
Medicine has seen a revolution in the organization of its practice 
and settings in recent years, fueled by attempts to control costs. Our 
highways are lined with Emergicenters, Surgicenters, MedFirsts, and 
any number of other "doc-in-a-box" practices. Health Maintenance 
Organizations and Preferred Provider Organizations have grown rap­
idly in response to the desire of corporations to lower their health 
costs by contracting with plans that will render services under guaran­
teed contracts at a discount. Private practice is slowly being replaced 
in many medical specialties by group practice. 
These changes may bode well for cost containment, but they do 
not, unfortunately, bode well for conversation. The ability of large 
numbers of patients to seek care from the specific physician of their 
choice is eroding. Indeed, it is becoming more and more common for 
patients (and even a few research subjects!) to have relationships with 
groups, companies or corporate entities rather than individual 
physicians. 
Groups, companies, and corporate entities have many virtues, but 
conversation is not one of them. Anyone who has received a letter 
from a group health plan announcing a change or revision in the scope 
of the plan would not, I suspect, be overcome with a powerful desire to 
engage in a dialogue with the author of such a communication (if such 
a term can be applied to these missives) if in fact an author does in­
deed exist. 
The organization and structure of medicine is moving rapidly 
along a path that has characterized much of medical practice in this 
century: more centralization, more economies of scale, more institu­
tionalization, more teams, more monetarization, and commodification. 
Talk of revitalizing the need for conversation will fall on deaf bureau­
cratic ears unless care is taken to preserve intimacy, liability, and re­
sponsibility in the increasingly impersonal world of medical practice. 
I am a bit unfair in arguing that Professor Katz does not give any 
recognition to the need to face the reluctance of patients to exhibit 
autonomy and participate fully as partners in conversations about 
their health and well-being. Professor Katz does argue that patients as 
much as physicians must accept an obligation to "participate in the 
process of thinking about choices" (p. 122). He enthusiastically en­
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dorses Mill's observation 13 that, while we ought not coerce people or 
interfere with their liberty, everyone is fair game for criticism, exhorta­
tion, education, or, to use Professor Katz's term, conversation. 
Nevertheless, there are serious flaws in his solutions to the prob­
lem of what to do with those who balk at autonomy and refuse to 
deliberate. First, there are many such people. It might be possible to 
have physicians act as amplifiers of moral autonomy if the need were 
small, but I fear it is not. The amount of exhortation, encouragement, 
and entreating required is likely to tax the patience of even the 
staunchest proponent of personal freedom. 
Second, in Professor Katz's analysis, it is the physician who must 
entreat patients to deliberate when they do not wish or are afraid to do 
so. But this obligation, of course, puts the mantle of authority 
squarely back on the physician's shoulders. It is only the physician in 
this view who can see the need for autonomy and entreat the patient to 
converse as an alternative to simply dumping autonomy into the 
healer's or researcher's lap. 
If the only source of autonomy enhancement in health care is the 
physician, then has very much progress been made in removing the 
stifling veneer of authority that so hinders communication? The 
power relationship between physician and patient, particularly when 
resources are tight and physicians control access to them, is not con­
ducive to assigning the task of exhortation to autonomy solely to those 
who are the gatekeepers of the system. 
Lastly, patients, like physicians, often have a great deal of vested 
interest in avoiding deliberation where w.atters of therapy or research 
are concerned. The dying cancer patient, offered the latest immuno­
logical wonder potion of genetic engineering, complains "What choice 
do I have but to take the damn drug?" Those who wish to keep the 
embers of autonomy glowing in such an unfortunate soul can offer 
choices about slow and rapid death, painful and less painful death, and 
knowledge that mayor may not benefit others, but from the point of 
view of the dying patient, this may look like a terrifyingly scant menu 
of options. While neither the patient nor the treating physician or re­
searcher may believe that deliberation will adversely effect the progno­
sis, can we really say that it is morally preferable to face the prospect 
of imminent death or severe, disabling disease reflectively rather than 
with an attitudinal mixture of denial, repression, and magical­
thinking? 
I suspect that if patients are going to be encouraged to talk, it will 
13. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 21-23 (1947) (\859). 
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take more than exhortations from physicians. I think patients will re­
quire help from both medical and non-medical sources. Some tradi­
tional sources of help in getting people talking about uncomfortable or 
disturbing matters, the schools and the churches, seem strangely quiet 
about matters pertaining to health care. Abortion aside, our colleges, 
secondary schools and elementary schools, and our churches and syn­
agogues have little to say about what one ought to know, scientifically 
or spiritually, in talking to the doctor. 
I would venture to say that the average priest or rabbi is better 
prepared to deal with dead bodies than with bodies that are sick, im­
paired, or possible candidates for resuscitation or intensive care. Our 
high school graduates emerge from school ready to deal with com­
puters, but ignorant of the difference between a hospital and a nursing 
home, and blissfully unaware of what their rights and obligations 
might be when they fall into the maw of medicine. Key social institu­
tions must exert greater efforts to educate the public about health care 
if the foundation for autonomous behavior is to exist. 
Patients and research subjects need help in accepting their auton­
omy inside the medical system as well. Research subjects need to have 
standard means available for hearing other voices besides the siren-like 
call of the researchers who wish to recruit them. IRBs might play this 
role, but their willingness to do so seems to be faltering in the face of 
institutional and peer pressures to the contrary.14 
Those who seek therapy need more than an offer, even if it is a 
serious one, of conversation before the CAT scanner hums or the scal­
pel is wielded. They need to talk to others with medical knowledge 
but whom they are not afraid to offend, repudiate, or embrace. Nurses 
and social workers would appear to be likely sources of informed med­
ical opinion and even encouragement to autonomy in the face of physi­
cian power and authority. Both these groups have acquired a fair 
amount of expertise at how best to preserve autonomy in the face of 
authority within health care contexts. Neither group is likely to 
frighten or intimidate the patient in the way that a physician, whether 
willingly or more likely unwillingly, will probably do. 
Professor Katz has made a persuasive case for conversation as the 
linchpin of doctor-patient relationships. I have tried to suggest that, 
while endorsing his argument, there are additional steps that will need 
to be taken both within and outside of medicine if the probability of 
14. Levine & Caplan, Beyond Localism: A Proposal for A National Research Review 
Board, IRB, Apr. 3, 1986, at 7-9; Sheldon, The IRB's Responsibility to Itself, HASTING 
CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 11-12. 
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conversation occurring is to increase. Physicians and patients will 
have to be willing to relinquish values and norms that both have found 
fulfilling if talk is to replace silence in medical encounters. However, 
the rewards of conversation, as Professor Katz's book reveals, are far 
greater than continuing to pay the high costs silence imposes on both 
physicians and patients. 
